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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-4616 
 ___________ 
 
 RHONSHAWN JACKSON, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
SGT. MR. TAYLOR, Property Sgt.; ENGLISH, P. Officer; R.H.U. L.T.; R.H.U. SGT.; 
MAJOR OF THE GUARDS; DAVID J. CLOSE; RANDALL BRITTON; DORETTA 
CHECCHARICH, Supt. Assistant, Grievance Coordinator; TPR FERGUSON; Grievance 
Officer; MOORE-SMEAL; MAJOR HORTON; MR. BLAKE; DPT. KESSLING; E. 
TICE; MAJOR HOLLIBAUGH; PA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS; JEFFREY BEARD 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 3-11-cv-00265) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 8, 2012 
 Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
 
 (Opinion filed: March 13, 2012) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 On March 19, 2009, Pennsylvania inmate Rhonshawn Jackson was involved in an 
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altercation with a guard at SCI Houtzdale.  Jackson was placed into restricted housing 
and was transferred to SCI Huntingdon the following day.  Upon learning that some of 
his property—including personal and religious items—had been destroyed as contraband 
prior to being shipped to Huntingdon, Jackson attempted to right this perceived wrong by 
pursuing administrative grievances; having failed to obtain administrative relief, Jackson 
filed suit, alleging that the defendants (employees of the Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections) had violated his constitutional rights by improperly disposing of his 
property.  Jackson invoked 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986, as well as the 
Americans With Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and Pennsylvania state law. 
 Following a protracted discovery period, the defendants moved for summary 
judgment.1
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “Our scope of review over the 
district court’s order dismissing parts of the complaint and granting summary judgment is 
plenary.”  Berger v. Edgewater Steel Co., 911 F.2d 911, 916 (3d Cir. 1990).  “We may 
affirm for any reason supported by the record, even if not relied on by the District Court.”  
Otto v. Pa. State Educ. Ass’n-NEA, 330 F.3d 125, 140 n.17 (3d Cir. 2003). 
  The Magistrate Judge recommended that the suit be dismissed in part 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and that summary judgment be granted for the defendants 
on the remaining claims.  Overruling Jackson’s objections, the District Court adopted the 
recommendations, and this appeal followed. 
                                                 
1 We have simplified the somewhat unusual procedural history of the case in the 
District Court, as it is not germane to the present appeal. 
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 In their summary-judgment motion, the defendants argued that Jackson had failed 
to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit, as is required by the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.  Jackson’s final grievance appeal, they noted, 
was initially rejected on July 13, 2009, as he had failed to provide copies of relevant 
documents from earlier in the grievance process.  See, e.g., Am. Compl. Ex. E, ECF No. 
10.  On August 11, 2009, the grievance appeal was dismissed, apparently because 
Jackson had “not provided th[e] Office with required documentation for proper review 
although [he] was reminded to do so.”  Am. Compl. Ex. D.  In her affidavit, Assistant 
Chief Grievance Officer Tracy Williams confirmed that the grievance was dismissed due 
to Jackson’s failure to correctly file supplementary material, and that the Secretary’s 
Office of Grievances and Appeals received no other grievances from Jackson in either 
2009 or 2010.  See Williams Dec. ¶¶ 13–15, ECF No. 69-7.  In response, Jackson argued 
that he attempted to submit the documents, but implied that they were not received and/or 
were ignored.  See, e.g., Pl.’s Br. 3, ECF No. 79. 
 It is well established that a prisoner’s failure to properly comply with the prison’s 
grievance process can lead to procedural default of his claims.  See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 
F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2004).  The regulations in place at the time required: 
[a]n inmate appealing a grievance to final review [to be] responsible for 
providing the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals with all 
required documentation relevant to the appeal.  A proper appeal to final 
review shall include photocopies of the initial grievance, initial review 
response, the inmate appeal to the Facility Manager, and the Facility 
Manager’s decision.  Failure to provide the proper documentation may 
result in the appeal being dismissed. 
4 
 
DC-ADM 804 § VI(D)(1)(g) (2004), ECF No. 69-2 (emphasis added).  While Jackson 
claimed that he did forward the requested material, he did not go beyond the pleadings 
and point to evidence supporting his argument, as he was required to do to survive a 
summary-judgment motion.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986); see 
also Nisenbaum v. Milwaukee Cnty., 333 F.3d 804, 810 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Allegations in a 
complaint are not evidence.”).  The affidavit he provided was conclusory, stating only 
that he “exhausted [his] grievance to Camp Hill but to no avail.”  Jackson Decl. ¶ 9, ECF 
No. 83.  And while he attached a May 28, 2010 letter from one David Close in support of 
his argument that he submitted the requested documents again following the dismissal of 
his grievance, see Jackson Decl. Ex. 24, his attempts to comply with facility instructions 
after his appeal had been dismissed are of no moment.  In sum, that Jackson failed to 
properly exhaust his administrative remedies prior to initiating his lawsuit is not 
genuinely in dispute, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), and the defendants were thus properly 
entitled to summary judgment.2
 For the foregoing reasons, and as this appeal presents no substantial question, we 
  Since the suit therefore lacked merit, the District Court 
correctly denied Jackson’s request for counsel.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155–56 
(3d Cir. 1993). 
                                                 
2 We understand the District Court to have dismissed Jackson’s property-
deprivation due-process claim while granting summary judgment on all other 
claims.  We agree with the District Court’s disposition of the property-deprivation 
claim, as Jackson was provided a meaningful post-deprivation remedy.  Monroe v. 
Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 210 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 
533 (1984)). 
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will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 
246, 248 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam);  see also 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
